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Emmaneel: Insurance Law

NOTE
HIDING BEHIND POLICY:
CONFUSING COMPENSATION
WITH INDEMNIFICATION

[l]t seems only fair that if, in fact, the insurance company has,
by wrongfully refusing to settle, caused the insured to incur
substantial damages, it should be the company, not the insured,
that should ultimately be responsible. To conclude otherwise is
to say that the insurer should not be responsible for the damage
it has caused because the amount of the damage it caused was
so great. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
2

In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance CO., the
California Supreme Court held that an insurer may not indemnify its insured for a punitive damages judgment in a third
party action. 3 Even if the excess judgment is the result of the
insurer's bad faith breach of its duty to settle a third party action on behalf of its insured, an insured may not recover if it
seeks compensatory damages that include a punitive damages

1

ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 5.12, at 325 (3d ed. 1995 &
Supp. 1999).
2
3

975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999).
.

See ill. at 658.
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judgment.' The California Supreme Court found that to conclude otherwise would violate California's long established
public policy precluding indemnification of punitive damages. 5
This Note examines the faulty reasoning in the California
Supreme Court's decision. Part II briefly discusses relevant
principles of insurance law. Part III outlines the facts underlying PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., including the initial Colorado lawsuit that evolved into the case
ultimately presented to the California Supreme Court. Part IV
explains the procedural history of the case, including the California Court of Appeal's opinion and PPG Industries, Inc.'s appeal to the California Supreme Court. Part V details the California Supreme Court's analysis and its focus on California's
public policy against indemnification of punitive damages.
Part VI discusses Justice Mosk's heated dissent and his opposition to what he viewed as the majority's apparent favoritism
of insurers. Finally, Part VII criticizes the California Supreme
Court for ignoring PPG Industries, Inc.'s allegations that it
was entitled to recover consequential damages arising from
Transamerica's bad faith failure to settle a third party claim,
thereby setting a precedent that allows insurers to escape liability for their own tortious conduct.

II.

BACKGROUND

The relationship between an insurer and its insured has
evolved into one that centers on good faith and fair dealing. 6
Since 1882, courts have recognized the existence of a special
relationship between an insurer and its insured, "emphasiz[ing] that the relationship was built on mutual confidence
and ... that a spirit of good faith and fair dealing between the
parties should mark every insurance contract..,7
Courts
stressed the importance of this relationship as they expanded
4

5
6

•

See id.
See id.

See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.02, at 1·
7 (1999).
7

[d. (citing Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig & Co., 80 Ky. 223 (1882».
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an insurer's contractual legal responsibilities to its insured
beyond those ordinarily imposed on parties involved in private
contracts. 8 They have reasoned that such an expansion is necessary due to the adhesive nature of standardized insurance
contracts and the unequal bargaining power created by them. 9
Further, the public nature of the insurance industry and the
insured's reliance on the loss protection of the policy have
proved to be compelling reasons for courts to hold insurers to a
higher standard of conduct. 10
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURER-INSURED RELATIONSHIP

Historically, the relationship between an insurer and its
insured was considered equivalent to the relationship between
a debtor and a creditor or, stated more simply, "one contracting
party to another contracting party.,,11 However, with the advent of the judicially created implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, which provides that an insurer will not infringe upon the insured's right to recover under the terms of its
policy, courts have begun to recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship.12 In 1980, in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance CO.,13 the California Supreme Court noted:

s
9

See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 1-8.
See ill.

10

See ill. (citing Healy Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1977); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1979); and
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967».
11 [d. § 1.05, at 1-14 (citing COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 23.11, at 11
(2d ed. 1960».
12 See ill. A fiduciary is defined as a "person holding the character of a trustee, or a
character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved
in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. A person having a
duty, created by this undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters
connected with such undertaking ...." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
California's jury instructions define a fiduciary relationship as existing "whenever
under the circumstances trust and confidence reasonably may be and is reposed by one
person in the integrity and fidelity of another." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CML (BAJI) 12.36 (6th ed. 1977).
13

598 P.2d 452 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (holding that the relationship between an insurer and its insured is that ofa fiduciary).
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[A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a
manufactured product, the obligations of insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage. The obligations of good faith
and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public
trust must go private responsibility consonant
with that trust. 14
It is important to recognize, however, tpat in many jurisdictions a fiduciary relationship between an insurer and an insured is not created until the insurer assumes the defense. IS
In other words, in those jurisdictions the "mere existence of the
insurer-insured relationship" does not thereby impose a fiduci.
ary du t y upon an msurer.
~

As courts continued to define the realm of the insurerinsured relationship, they also worked diligently to develop
tort law. 17 Tort law became frequently utilized by courts in
insurance disputes, eventually developing into four theories of
recovery applied in insurance law. IS One of the most common
recognized theories of recovery is an insured's breach of the
19
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

14

Id. (quoting Goodman & Seaton, Forward: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings
and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 309, 346-347
(1974».
15

See, e.g. Kosce v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 377 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1977) (holding that an insurer's fiduciary duty does not extend to refusal to defend a third party action against its insured).
16
Id.
17

IS

See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.06, at 1-16 to 1-17.
See id at 1-17.

19 See id. The other tort theories of recovery that have been utilized by courts in
insurance disputes are fraud, intentional infliction of mental distress, and tortious
interference with a protected property interest. See id. (citing DOBBS, LAw OF
REMEDIES § 6.12 (2d ed. 1993». This note will not discuss these theories, but will
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B. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GoOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, inherent in every contract, posits "that neither party will do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of
the agreement. "20 Insurance policies are included among the
contracts subject to this implied covenant. 21 Although it is the
contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured
that implicates the duty of good faith and fair dealing, many
jurisdictions have also recognized the existence of an extracontractual duty owed by the insurer in fulfilling its obligations
under the policy in good faith.22 These jurisdictions have used
the implied covenant "as a basis for defining the duty owed by
the insurer to the insured, and have concluded the action is
one in tort."23 For example, the California Supreme Court held
in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance CO. 24 that the duty imposed on
the insurer by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
independent of the performance required under the terms of
the contract.25 Thus; the court reasoned that the mere existence of a contract does not shield an insurer from liability for
the torts it commits when it interferes with an insured's right
to receive "the benefits of the agreement. "26 In jurisdictions
that have similarly found an extracontractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing, an insurer's breach of the duty may be
subject to either or both the law of torts and/or contracts.27

instead focus on an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
20
[d. § 2.01, at 2-1.
21

See id. at 2-1 to 2-2. See also Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198
(Cal. 1958).
22 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-3 (citing Johnsen v. California State
Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973».

23

JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAw IN A NUTSHELL, at 309 (3d ed. 1996).
24

510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).

25

See id.

26

[d.

See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-4 (citing Frazier v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985) (finding that plaintiff was allowed to choose between tort and contract causes of action».
27
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Some jurisdictions, however, have yet to impose tort liability
upon an insurer for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, despite the national trend to do SO.28
Eventually, judicial recognition of the special relationship
created between the parties to an insurance contract resulted
in the tort of bad faith.29 Essentially, an insurer's breach of the
covenant constitutes bad faith, thereby entitling the insured to
restitution or to recover any damages incurred. 8o A majority of
jurisdictions have held an insurer liable in third party actions
for breaching the duty required by the covenant. 81 A growing
number of jurisdictions are expanding this liability to first
party actions as well. 32 Generally, to recover in a tort action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an insured must demonstrate that "the insurer had a duty
to the insured, the insurer breached that duty, and the insured
suffered damage as a proximate result of the breach."sa An
insurer may defend itself against such a claim by demonstrating that the underlying claim is not covered by the policy, or
34
that a contract either does not exist or is voidable.
C. AN INSURER'S DUTY TO SETTLE

28 See id. § 2.02, at 2-5. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 285
N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972). The categorization of a cause of action for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as either contract or tort "has not
appeared to affect the remedies available against the insurer, [however] it does determine which of the two statute of limitations is to be applied." DOBBYN, supra note 23,
at 309. Generally, "the primary differences in characterizing an action as one in tort
rather than contract are: the statute of limitations that will fix the time within which
the action must be brought; the nature of the conduct that will prove the breach; and
the type of damages that can be recovered." 2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE
PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION § 24.3, at 24-6 (Bob Pickus, et al. eds. 1999).

29

See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.08, at 1-31 to 1-38.

30 See id. § 2.01, at 2-2. See, e.g., Comunsle v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d
198 (Cal. 1958).
31 S ee id.

32

See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 2-2.

33

2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION § 24.25, at
24-20 (Bob Pickus et al. eds. 1999).
34

.

See id. § 24.48, at 24-37 to 24-38.
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An insurer's duty to settle actions pending against its insured is implied in the covenant of good faith and fair
35
dealing. This duty is owed solely to the insured. 36 As such,
only the insured has standing to sue the insurer for a breach,s7
which typically occurs when an insurer fails "to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits.,,38 Once an insurer's breach is proven, the insured is entitled to recover "the
full amount of the underlying judgment, including the amount
exceeding the policy limits, and for any other consequential
damages suffered by the insured, such as damages for emotional distress.,,39 Upon a showing that the insurer's conduct in
failing to settle was oppressive or fraudulent, the insured may
40
also be entitled to recover punitive damages. However, even
if an insurer is not liable for failing to accept a reasonable settlement offer, its overall conduct during settlement negotiations may still amount to a bad faith breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 41 More importantly, an
insurer does not have to actually act in bad faith to breach its
42
duty to settle. Rather, an insured must only sh~w that the
insurer failed to settle a claim "that it would have settled had
it treated the claim as if [it] alone would be liable for the entire
potential verdict.,,43

35 See id. § 26.2, at 26-3 (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co" 328 P.2d 198,
201 (Cal. 1958».
36 See id. § 26.3, at 26-3.
37 See id. It is important to note that anyone who has "acquir[ed] the insured's
rights against the insurer" also has "standing to sue the insurer for breach of the duty
to settle." For example, "a third party claimant commonly acquires the insured's right
to sue through an assignment. The assignment does not change the basic nature of
the action as one that must be evaluated exclusively in terms of the insured's rights."
ld.
3S

PICKUS, ET AL.,

supra note 32, § 26.4 at 26-3 to 26-4.

39

1d.

40

See id. § 26.35, at 26-2l.

41
42

See id. § 26.5, at 26-4.

43

See WINDT, supra note 1, § 5.12, at 323.
1d.
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. It is important to recognize that an insurer's duty to settle
arises only when the policy covers the loss claimed in a third
44
party action. Once this duty arises, an insurer is obligated by
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to settle a third
party action against its insured "when there is a great risk of a
recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be
made within those limits.,,45 Although an insurer's duty is
usually triggered by a settlement offer that is within policy
limits, "case law suggests that any settlement offer triggers the
insurer's duty of good faith to its insured and requires the insurer at least to explore the offer. n46 Thus, as part of its duties
implied in the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an insurer is obligated to give, at a minimum, equal weight to the
insured's and its own interests. 47

At the point that the insurer unreasonably refuses to settle,
the breach occurs. 48 However, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run "until the insured suffers a binding judgment
in excess of the policy limits and damages can be
ascertained."'9 As previously stated, an insured may bring an
action against its insurer for failure to settle under either a
contract theory or a negligence theory, depending on the jurisdiction. 50 Although the statute of limitations is longer for contract actions, an insured that chooses to sue in contract may
lose its right to recover punitive damages. 51 In pleading an

44

See PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.18, at 26-9 (citing Heredia v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 279 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991); Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.
1981), Merrit v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973); Tan Jay Int'l v. Canadian
Indem Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1988); and Continental Cas. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 268
Cal. Rptr. 193 (1990».
45

46
47
48

49
50

Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
PICKUS, ET AL.,

supra note 32, § 26.14, at 26-8.

See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201.
See PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.12, at 26-7.
d

[,

.

See id. at § 26.11, at 26-7.

See id. The statute of limitations for an action based on a written contract is four
years after the action accrues. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (Deering 1999). There
51
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action for negligent failure to settle, the applicable standard is
"whether a prudent insurer, without policy limits, would have
accepted the offer. »52 To successfully prove a cause of action for
failure to settle, the insured must show: first, the insurer had
a contractual duty to "indemnify the insured for loss resulting
from the underlying claim;" second, the insurer had "a duty to
settle the claim within policy limits;" third, the insurer
breached its duty by "either refusing a reasonable settlement
offer within policy limits or failing to explore settlement within
the policy limits on a conditional offer;" and fourth, the insurer's breach proximately caused the insured's damage. 53
D. INDEMNIFICATION OF PuNITIVE DAMAGES

1. California: A Policy Against Indemnification
California has long had a public policy prohibiting indemnification by an insurer of a punitive damages judgment against
its insured.54 California Civil Code section 1668 states that
any contract which seeks to exempt an individual "from responsibility for his own fraud or willful injury
to ... another ... [is] against the policy of law.»55 Additionally,
California Insurance Code section 533 specifically bars insurer
liability "for the willful act of the insured. »56 Thus, because
punitive damages are recoverable only when a wrongdoer has

is an exception to title insurance policies that have a two year statute of limitations.
See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 339 (1) (Deering 1999). Actions based on an oral contract
have a two year statute of limitations. See ill. There are several tort statutes oflimitation which are applicable to actions based on an insurer's breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "The nature of the right sued on, and not the
nature of the remedy sought, determines which of the various tort statutes of limitation" will apply. PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 24.18 at 24-15 (citing Purdy v. Pacific
Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 537 (1984».
52 PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.6, at 26-5. The standard is the same whether
the action is pleaded in contract or in tort. See ill.
63

[d. § 26.13, at 26-7 to 26-8.

54 See JUSTICE H. WALTER CROSKY, ET AL, CALIFORmA PRACTICE GUIDE, INSURANCE
LITIGATION § 7:343 (1995). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999).
55

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (Deering 1999).

55

CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999).
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acted with "malice, fraud or oppression,n57 which by their nature are willful acts, section 533 effectively prohibits indemnification of punitive damages arising out of a third party lawsuit.58 The policy's rationale centers on the notion that an insured should not be allowed to pass on to its insurer liability to
a third party arising from its intentional conduct. 59 Thus, even
if an insurance policy does not specifically exclude an insured's
claim for such damages, the public policy prohibition is implied. so

2. Other States Not Subject to California Public Policy
Although California has a strong public policy prohibiting
indemnification of punitive damages, out-of-state punitive
damage awards may not be subject to its policy.6t Currently,
jurisdictions differ regarding the insurability of punitive damages. 62 In jurisdictions that prohibit indemnification, such as
California, punitive damages are allowed only in instances of
egregious conduct and for the sole (purpose of punishing and
deterring the conduct. 63 These jurisdictions believe that insuring such conduct would undermine this policy.64 On the
other hand, jurisdictions that allow indemnity tend to award
punitive damages at lower thresholds, such as "gross negligence or reckless and wanton conduct."eo These jurisdictions
often recognize the unfairness of not indemnifying an insured

67

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1999).

68

See CROSKY, ET AL, supra note 54, § 7:345.
(Deering 1999).

See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 533

69 See id. at § 7:343 (quoting City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr
494, 496 (1979».

60 See id. at §.7:344 (quoting Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810811 (1985».
61

See id. at § 7:346 (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Fireboard Corp., 762 F.Supp.
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aft'd without published opn., 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992».
62 See, e.g., City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct.
App.1979).
63

See City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979).
64 See id.
66

1d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/7

10

Emmaneel: Insurance Law

INSURANCE LAW

2000]

647

"who might well be ruined financially by a judgment for punitive damages as the re'sult of conduct of no more flagrancy
than an act of 'gross negligence,' a monetary 'reckless' act, or
conduct 'contrary to social interests.',,&6 Thus, California's
public' policy against indemnification of punitive damages
would not necessarily preclude coverage of a judgment against
a California insured for an out-of-state award of punitive damages. 67 Although California has an interest in awarding punitive damages to punish and deter misconduct by its own citizens, it does not have an interest in deterring conduct in other
states. 68 Thus, when a plaintiff in another state is awarded
punitive damages for a defendant's reckless or wanton conduct,
as opposed to malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct,
California's anti-indemnification policy may not apply.69 In
such circumstances, the insurer is obligated to pay the judgment under the terms of the ,policy. 70
III. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CO.
In 1987, PPG Industries, Inc. ("PPG") became the successor
in interest to Solaglas California, Inc. ("Solaglas"), which distributed and installed replacement windshields in cars and
trucks. 71 Upon doing so, PPG became financially liable for a
Colorado judgment against Solaglas that exceeded Solaglas'
insurance policy limits. 72 Prior to trial in the underlying law-

66 [d.

67

(quoting Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1921 (Or. 1977».

See EUGENE R. ANDERSON, ET AL., INSURANCE LITIGATION CoVERAGE § 8.01, at 83 to 8-4 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing application of New York's public policy against indemnification of punitive damages to out-of-state awards).
68

See Zimmerman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 224 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1986).

69 See CROSKY, ET AL., supra note 54, § 7:346 (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Fireboard Corp., 762 F.Supp. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd without published opn., 953 F.2d
1386 (9th Cir. 1992).

70 See ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 67, § 8.01, at 8-4.
71

See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889,891 (Cal. Ct.
App.1996).

72

See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (No. S056618).
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suit, Solaglas' insurer, Transamerica Insurance Company
("Trans america"), refused several settlement offers that were
within policy limits despite Solaglas' high risk of suffering an
excess judgment. 73 The trial ultimately resulted in a one million dollar punitive damages judgment against Solaglas. 74 PPG
sued Transamerica in California, claiming that as Solaglas'
insurer, Transamerica breached its duty to settle inherent in
75
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
A. THE FACTS THAT INSTIGATED A THIRD PARTY LAWSUIT
AGAINST SOLAGLAS
On April 18, 1980, an acquaintance ("Buyer") of George
Miller, the injured party, purchased a 1980 General Motors
Corporation ("GMC") light-duty pickup truck from a dealer. 76
Several days after the purchase, Buyer "returned to the dealer
to have a crack in the truck's windshield repaired.,,77 As was
its practice, the dealer sent the warranty windshield repair
order to Solaglas. 78 Pursuant to the dealer's request, Solaglas
installed a replacement windshield. 79 Despite specifications in
GMC manuals, industry publications, and safety regulation
requirements, Solaglas installed the windshield without a urethane sea1. 80 Typically, windshields installed without urethane
seals require about thirty minutes of labor. 81 Evidence showed,
however, that Solaglas charged for 2.8 hours of labor to install
the windshield without a urethane seal.82

73

74

75

See id.
See id.
See PPG Indu8., Inc. v. Tran8america Ina. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999).

76 See Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 562 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
The court did not identify the buyer of the truck.
.
77 d
l< •
78

79

80
81
82

See id.
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
See id.
See id.
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On July 17, 1983, Buyer loaned the truck to George Miller. 83
While Miller was driving, he approached an intersection at
which the traffic lights were out of order.54 Miller slowed
down, but did not stop, and continued to enter the
intersection. 85 The truck was struck from behind by another
86
vehicle. As a result of the impact, the truck was forced onto a
curb at the corner of the intersection and collided into a metal
87
light pole.
At some point during the collision, the truck's
windshield "popped out,,86 and Miller, who was not wearing a
seat belt, was thrown through the windshield opening.89 The
collision instantly rendered Miller a quadriplegic. 90 Miller subsequently filed suit against Solaglas in Colorado. 91 In 1987,
PPG purchased stock in Solaglas, thus becoming its successor
in interest and a defendant in Miller's lawsuit. 92
B. MILLER v. SOLAGLAS: ROUND ONE

93

In 1983, Miller sued GMC, Solaglas, and the truck dealer,
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages for negligence and strict liability.94 GMC and the dealer each settled
with Miller during the first trial, leaving Solaglas as the sole

83 See

Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.

54

See id.

85
86

See id.
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.

87 See
86

Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.

PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.

89

See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.
id.

90 See

91

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.

92 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. A successor in interest is "one who follows another in ownership or control of property.. .. In the case of corporations, the term
ordinarily indicates statutory succession as, for instance, when a corporation changes
its name but retains same property." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY at 1431-1432 (6th ed.
1990).

93

870 P.2d 559 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

94 See id. at 562.
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95

defendant. At the time of the incident, Solaglas was covered
96
by several insurance polices. Two of the polices were issued
to Solaglas by its liability insurance carrier, Transamerica, and
97
had a combined coverage totaling $1.5 million per occurrence.
Solaglas also carried a nine million dollar excess liability insurance policy issued by Industrial Indemnity Company.98
Solaglas tendered the defense to Transamerica, giving timely
99
notice ofthe lawsuit. Upon agreeing to provide the defense in
the Miller action, Transamerica informed Solaglas that neither
of its Transamerica insurance policies provided coverage for
any punitive damages awarded against it. 1°O Under a reservation of rights, Transamerica appointed independent counsel to
101
defend Solaglas.
Although settlement negotiations began early in the process, all attempts to settle the lawsuit between Miller and Solaglas proved unsuccessful. 102 Miller offered to settle the case for
$1.5 million, the total coverage provideq by the Transamerica
policies. lOS However, Transamerica refused to offer more that
$250,000, despite independent counsel's recommendation that

95 See id. The court did not specify what amounts GMC and the truck dealer settled for.

96

97

See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
See id.

98

See id. Excess insurance policies cover "the excess above and beyond that which
may be collected on other insurance." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY at 562 (6th ed. 1990).
99

See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.

100

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.

101 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. A reservation of rights notice "is a unilateral
statement by the insurer in writing notifying the insured of the insurer's intention to
continue with the defense while retaining the right to press all issues that could lead
to a finding of noncoverage. The primary purpose of the notice is to make the insured aware of the insurer's full intentions so that the insured cannot later claim that
the insurer waived its rights to claim noncoverage or is estopped to make such a claim
because the insured was misled into believing that the insurer had accepted liability
on the policy. Such notice is also intended to make the insured aware of the fact that
the insurer may decide to withdraw from the defense of the tort action at any time,
and, therefore, the insured would be well advised to hire his own attorney and conduct
his own investigation." DOBBYN, see supra note 23, at 309.

102
103

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
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Transamerica offer Miller at least $750,000 to settle the case. 104
With settlement negotiations having failed, the case was tried
before a jury in 1986. 105 The trial court dismissed Miller's
claim for punitive damages and failed to instruct the jury on
Miller's strict liability claim. l06 Thereafter, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Solaglas. l07 The jury found that Solaglas did
in fact act negligently, but that its negligence did not cause
Miller's injuries. 108 Miller appealed to the Colorado Court of
Appeals lO9 which reversed the jury's verdict and remanded the
case "for a new trial on all issues. "110
Prior to the second trial in January 1991, Miller again offered to settle with PPG, which had since become the successor
in interest to Solaglas, reducing his demand to one million
dollars. lll Again, Transamerica rejected Miller's demand and
subsequently reduced it own settlement offer to $100,000. 112
On at least four separate occasions throughout settlement negotiations, PPG demanded that Transamerica settle within the
policy limits. 11s
Each time, Transamerica denied PPG's
114
request despite damaging deposition testimony presented by
one of PPG's experts and a trial court ruling that Miller had
"made the prima facie showing necessary to discover financial
information related to his punitive damages claim. "115

104

See id.

105

.

See ,d.
106
id
See .
107

108

See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.
See id .

109 See Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., No. 86CA1213 (Colo. Ct. App. September
8, 1988). Miller "did not appeal the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on his
strict liability claim." Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.
110

Miller, 870 P.2d at 562 (citing Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., No. 86CA1213
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993».
111

See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l.
ee id .

112S

113
114
115

• •

.

See PetitIoner's Bnef, supra note 72, at 4. See also PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l.
.

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654.

Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4.
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C. MILLER V. SOLAGLAS: ROUND Two

The second trial resulted in a jury verdict against Solaglas
and PPG, finding both entities negligent and strictly liable for
116
Miller's injuries. The jury did not find any comparative negligence on Miller's part and, thus, awarded him $5.1 million in
compensatory damages, which included "$2.6 million for economic damages" and "$2.5 million for mental pain and suffering.,,1l7 The jury also awarded one million dollars in punitive
damages, which was primarily awarded based on Solaglas'
failure to use urethane seals during the installation of the
windshield, yet charging Miller for the labor hours that would
have been required had urethane seals been used. 118 Before
entering the final judgment, however, the trial court offset the
jury award by the amount of Miller's prior settlements with
GMC and the truck dealer, and then added prejudgment interest to the resulting sum. 119
Solaglas appealed the final judgment to the Colorado Court
of Appeals, and Miller cross-appealed the trial court's calculation of the prejudgment interest. 12O Solaglas contended that
there was no evidence to support the one million dollar puni-

Iffi

.

See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l.
117

•

M,ller, 870 P.2d at 562. See also PPG, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
118
S ee id.
119

See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562.

120

See id. Since PPG's suit against Transamerica concerned the jury's award of
punitive damages, see PPG, 975 P.2d 652, this note will only discuss that aspect of the
decision rendered by the Colorado Court of Appeals. In sum, the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that: (1) defendants waived their right to assert a defense of res judicata
by failing to set forth the defense in their answer to plaintiffs complaint; (2) the jury
could have found that Solaglas was a manufacturer for purposes of Miller's products
liability claim; (3) the jury could have found that Miller's negligence in failing to stop
at the intersection did not proximately cause the accident and that Miller's injuries
would have occurred despite his negligence; (4) the trial court's admission of safety
codes and standards was not reversible error; (5) evidence presented by Miller warranted award of exemplary damages; (6) the trial court's admission of video deposition
testimony was not reversible error; and (7) the trial court correctly· offset the jury
award by the amount of the settlements with GMC and the truck dealer before adding
prejudgment interest. See id. at 559.
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tive damages award. ~21 The Court of Appeals disagreed, recognizing that juries have the authority to award "reasonable exemplary damages" in any case "in which damages are assessed
and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of
fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct."122 Thus, a plaintiff need only show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct
causing the injury was done so "with an evil intent" to injure
the plaintiff, "or with such wanton and reckless disregard of
the plaintiffs rights as to demonstrate a wrongful motive."l23
The Court of Appeals determined that Miller presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that after thirty years of experience in glass replacement, Solaglas deliberately made it
standard practice to install replacement windshields with silicone instead of urethane. l24 Solaglas followed this policy "despite a- GMC manual requiring the use of urethane . . . , despite a NAGS Calculator parts list and price guide indicating
that urethane could be required ... , despite industry publications and conventions discussing the use of urethane, and despite industry safety standards requiring the use of
urethane. "126 Miller further provided evidence that Solaglas
instructed its stores to charge for 2.8 hours of labor for the installations of windshields without a urethane seal even though
such installation only required thirty minutes. 126 In affirming
the verdict, the court concluded that a jury could have found

121 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. Specifically, defendants argued that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Miller "proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Solaglas' conduct warranted the jury's award of $1
million in exemplary damages." Miller, 870 P.2d at 568.
122 Miller, 870 P.2d at 568 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1987».
123 [d. (citing Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985)
and Frick v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1979». The Colorado Court of Appeals defined
"wanton and reckless conduct" as "conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm to
another and is purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk in disregard of
the consequences." Miller, 870 P.2d at 668 (citing Tri-Aspen Construction Co. v. Johnson, 714 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1986); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984);
and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(b) (1987».
124

See Miller, 870 P.2d at 569.

126 [d.
126 See id.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Solaglas purposely performed
the installation of the windshield without the urethane seals
with disregard for the consequences of its actions, aware that
such conduct "created a substantial risk of harm to others. ,,127
PPG appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court. While its
appeal was pending, however, Miller offered to settle the case
for $4,500,000. 128 Again, Transamerica refused to accept
Miller's offer. 129 After the Colorado Supreme Court denied
PPG's petition for certiori in 1994, Transamerica paid $1.5
million, its combined policy limit, towards the $5.1 million jury
verdict, and $1,277,094.88 for Miller's costs and interest accrued on the judgment. ISO Industrial Indemnity, PPG's excess
carrier, paid the remaining $3.6 million in compensatory damages under Solaglas' excess liability coverage. l3l PPG, as Solaglas' successor in interest, was left to pay the one million dollars in punitive damages awarded to Miller. ls2
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1994, PPG sued Transamerica in California alleging that Transamerica breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in its policies. 133 PPG argued that Transamerica breached the covenant by refusing to settle the Miller
action, despite requests by Solaglas and PPG to do SO.l34 Thus,
Transamerica was required to compensate PPG for the one

127 [d. The Colorado Court of Appeals denied Miller's claim that the trial court
"erred in calculating prejudgment interest" since the court had previously held that
settlement proceeds "be deducted before adding statutory interest." [d. at 571 (citing
McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989».
128 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4.
129 S
ee id .
130
131

See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891.
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655.

132 See id. None of the decisions explain the extent of Industrial Indemnity's involvement in the settlement negotiations.
133

See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999).

134 See l·d•
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million dollars in punitive damages that it was ordered to pay
. theM'll
m
l er act'Ion. 135
In October 1994, Transamerica filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that it was not obligated to indemnify PPG
for the punitive damages awarded in the Miller lawsuit. ls6
Transamerica based its claim on the principle that an insurer
is not responsible for indemnifying an insured for a punitive
damages judgment, even if the insurer was unreasonable in its
failure to settle the case within the coverage policy limits. 137 In
September 1995, the trial court granted Transamerica's motion
for summary judgment. l38 PPG appealed. 139
The sole issue presented to the California Court of Appeal
was "whether consequential damages for breach of an insurer's
duty to reasonably settle a third party action can include punitive damages imposed against the insured in the third party
action. "140 The court noted that California's public policy allows a plaintiff to recover punitive damages only to punish a
defendant for fraudulent or malicious conduct, and thereby use
the defendant as an example to deter similar future conduct. 141
Allowing a defendant to be indemnified by its insurer for a punitive damages judgment would frustrate this policy by removing both the punishment and the threat of future punishment.142 This rationale applies, the court continued, even when
135 See id .
136 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Cal. Ct.
App.1996).
137 See id.
138 See id .

139 See id.
140

ld.

141 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892 (citing City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979».
142 See id. The Court of Appeal further noted that "public policy would likewise be
frustrated by indemnification of punitive damages assessed against a successor corporation for the wrongful conduct of its predecessor. Indeed, were indemnification allowed when a successor corporation is liable for punitive damages due to the conduct
of its prede.cessor, public policy could easily be frustrated by a restructuring of any
corporation facing the imposition of punitive damages." ld.
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the insured seeks to "pass on" the punitive damages to the insurer based on the insurer's "unreasonable refusal to settle."l43
The court recognized that in some instances, the insurer's
refusal to settle may rise to the same level of culpability as
that of the insured. l44 AS such, the insurer can be held liable
for bad faith to its insured for punitive damages. l46 However,
even if the insurer's conduct in refusing to settle justifies a punitive damages award, the insured cannot avoid punishment
for its own conduct by passing on its liability for punitive damages to its insurer. l46 To do so would violate public policy.147
Thus, the court concluded that although there would have been
no punitive damages award had Transamerica settled within
its policy limits in the Miller action, Solaglas' conduct in installing the windshield was also a cause of the award. l48 Accordingly, as a matter of public policy, the Court of Appeal concluded that PPG, as successor in interest, was financially responsible for the punitive damages awarded against Solaglas
149
in the Miller action.
PPG subsequently petitioned the Calil50
fornia Supreme Court for review.

V. THEMAJORITY'SANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court granted PPG's petition for
review on December 18, 1996. 151 The main issue presented to

143 [d.
144
145
146
147

at 896.

See id.
See,'d .
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
See id.

See id. PPG argued that since "the punitive damages would not have been
awarded had Transamerica accepted a settlement within policy limits," the punitive
damages were "akin to any other damages which may arise as a consequence of an
insurer's breach of the duty of good faith." [d.
148

149

150

See id. at 896-97.
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655.

151

See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999).
See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Lawyer's Mutual Insurance Company In Support of
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the court was whether an insured can sue its insurer for compensatory damages in an amount equal to a punitive damages
judgment rendered against the insured in a third party lawsuit. 152 The court held that such recovery is precluded and
would violate California's public policy.153

A.

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING VERSUS CAUSATION

The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the im154
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
This covenant
imposes certain obligations upon insurance companies, including the "obligation to accept a reasonable offer of settlement. ,,155 An insurer's failure to meet any of the obligations
imposed by the covenant is a breach of the covenant and may
result in tort liability on the part of the insurer. 156 Thus, if an
insurer's breach of the covenant proximately causes injury to
the insured, the insurer may be liable for any resulting dam157
ages.
In the instant case, PPG argued that had Transamerica settled the Miller action, the possibility of a lawsuit
would have been terminated and, thus, Solaglas' liability for
158
punitive damages would have been avoided.
Consequently,
PPG contended that Transamerica's failure to settle with
Miller proximately caused the jury's punitive damages
159
award.
In response to PPG's argument, the California Supreme
Court agreed that Transamerica's failure to settle the Miller

Respondent Transamerica Insurance Company at 3, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (No. 8056618 (1999».

1:;2

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655.

153 See id. at 658.
154 See id. at 655.
155 [d.
156

157

See id. (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (1988».
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655.
id.

158 S ee

159 See id.
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action was a cause-in-fact of the punitive damages award. 160
However, the court did not agree that Transamerica's failure to
settle was a proximate cause of the award. 161 In making this
distinction, the court explained that to prove that a defendant
caused a plaintiff's injuries, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injuries
and that the defendant's conduct proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries. 162 The court defined a cause-in-fact as "a necessary
antecedent of an event. ,,163 The court noted that in the instant
case, Solaglas' intentional misconduct during the windshield
installation was a cause-in-fact of the punitive damages
award. l64 However, the court also conceded that PPG would
not have been exposed to liability for punitive damages had
Transamerica settled the Miller action. l65 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that a determination of whether "the defendant's conduct was a necessary antecedent· of the injury does
not resolve the question of whether the defendant should be
liable."l66 Rather, in determining proximate cause, public policy limitations must be imposed in addition to causation standards. 167 The court then went on to discuss three public policy
considerations which it considered to "militate" against allow-

S ee id .
161 S
ee id .
160

162

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984».
163 Id.

The court did not further analyze this point.

164 See id. at 655-66.
165

S ee id.

166 Id.

at 656. The court continued, "the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond.
But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite
liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set society on edge and fill the courts with
endless litigation.'" Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS, § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting North v. Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012
(1894».
167 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. The court continued, "Justice Traynor observed,
proximate cause 'is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of causation, but with the
various considerations of policy that limit a~ actor's responsibility for the consequences ofhis conduct.'" Id.. (quoting Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372 (1945)
(Traynor, J., concurring».
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ing indemnification of punitive damages rendered against an
insured as a result of its own misconduct. 168
B. CALIFORNIA'S PuBLIC POLICY

According to the court, three public policy reasons prohib169
ited indemnification by Transamerica.
First, liability for intentional misconduct cannot be mitigated by another's negli170
gence.
Second, punitive damages are intended to punish the
171
wrongdoer and to deter such conduct in the future.
Third, a
wrongdoer cannot receive indemnification for punitive dam172
ages.

1. One's Liability Cannot Be Offset by the Negligence ofAnother
The court first considered California's public policy prohibiting mitigation of liability for intentional misconduct due to
another's negligence. 173 Relying on both California and Colorado law, the court stated that punitive damages may only be
awarded where the plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally engaged in misconduct to cause injury to the plaintiff, or did so "with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others. ,,174 In the underlying action, punitive damages were
awarded to Miller based on the jury's determination that Solaglas' installation of the windshield was intentional

168

PPG, 975 P.2d at 656.
ee ill.

169 S
170

See ill.

171

See ill.

172 See

id. at 656-57.

173 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656 (citing 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw,
TORTS § 1057 (9th ed. 1988) and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF TORTS, §65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984».
174 PPG, 975 P.2d at 656-57 (citing CAL. CN. CODE § 3294 (a) and (c) (Deering
1999); Miller v. Solaglas, 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993». The California
Supreme Court determined that since the rule regarding punitive damages is the
same in both California and Colorado, "punitive damages awarded under Colorado law
are equivalent in all relevant respects to punitive damages awarded under California
law." PPG, 975 P.2d at 656.
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misconduct. 17& Conversely, PPG's lawsuit against Transamerica "was based on Transamerica's alleged negligent fail176
ure to settle" the Miller action.
Thus, PPG's claim against
Transamerica was not based on Transamerica's bad faith in
177
breaching its contract with Solaglas.
Rather, PPG's claim
focused on Transamerica's tortious failure to satisfy the duty
required by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 178 As
such, the court concluded that the public policy prohibiting the
offset of liability damages by another's negligence would be
violated if PPG were allowed to shift its obligation to pay the
punitive
damages
awarded
against
Solaglas
to
. 179
Transamenca.

2. Punish and Deter By Way of Example
The court next discussed the public policy of allowing punitive damages for the purposes of punishing the wrongdoer and
l80
deterring similar conduct in the future. Again, the court was
reluctant to permit a wrongdoer to shift its liability for intentional misconduct to its insurer.l8l To do so would not only
pass the insurance company's increased costs to the public, but
would also defeat the purpose for awarding punitive damages
182
against a defendant.
The court stated that while compensatory damages are awarded to compensate a plaintiff for the
injuries he sustained, punitive damages are awarded to punish
and deter.l83 The court concluded that transferring PPG's bur-

See id. at 656.
176 [d.

17&

177 S

178

ee id.

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656.
ee id .

179 S

180 See id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999) and Lira v. Shelter Ins.
Co., 913 P.2d 514, 517 (Colo. 1996». California statute provides that punitive damages are "damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999).

181

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 657.
ee id .

182 S

183 See id.
.

.

The court quoted Peterson v. Supenor Court, 642 P.2d 1305, fn. 4 (Cal.
1982) (quoting Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432,
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den to pay punitive damages to Transamerica would violate
this public policy. 184

3. Indemnification of Punitive Damages Prohibited
Finally, the court addressed whether public policy allows an
intentional wrongdoer to receive indemnification for punitive
l85
damages.
In concluding that it does not, the court briefly
explained that the concept of indemnity obligates one party

to

reimburse another party for a sustained 10ss.186 The court acknowledged the possibility that an insurance company's "own
egregious misconduct may justify an award of punitive damages against it."ls7 However, it found that there is no justification

for

holding an insurer liable for the insured's
l88
misconduct.
In the Miller action, a Colorado jury awarded
punitive damages against Solaglas, not Transamerica, for its
"morally reprehensible behavior in installing the windshield on

the truck."lS9

The court thus concluded that in this case, re-

440-441 (5th Cir. 1962»: "The policy considerations in a state where, as in [California],
punitive damages are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem to require
that the damage rest ultimately as well as nominally on the party actually responsible
for the wrong. If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages have
already made the plaintiff whole...." ld.
184
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 657.
185 See id. (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). The court again noted that
Colorado "has the same public policy." ld. (citing Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514,
517 (Colo. 1996».
188 See id. (quoting Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97 (Cal.
1975»: "Indemnity, which may be express, implied, or equitable, is 'defined as the
obligation resting on one party to make good a loss or damage another party has incurred.''' ld.
lS7 ld. The court continued: "For example, if in addition to proving a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing proximately causing actual damages,
the insured proves by clear and convincing evidence that the insurance company itself
engaged in conduct that is oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, the insured may recover punitive damages from the insurance company...That issue is not present here."
ld. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, Ins.,
620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979); and Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal.
1974».
188
.
See id. at 658.
lS9
PPG. 975 P.2d at 658.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 7

662 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3

Quiring Transamerica to reimburse PPG for the punitive damages awarded against Solaglas in the Miller action would violate the public policy prohibiting such indemnification. 190
C. THE MAJORITY'S CONCLUSION

In keeping with the holdings of the high courts of other
states, the California Supreme Court held that an insured
cannot shift its liability for punitive damages arising out of a
third party lawsuit to its insurance company.191 This holds
true when such damages are awarded against the insured "as
a result of the insured's intentional, morally blameworthy behavior against the third party.,,192 The court further concluded
that allowing PPG to recover from Transamerica would violate
public policy which also prohibits indemnification of punitive
damages. 193 First, liability for intentional misconduct cannot
be mitigated by another's negligence. l94 Second, punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar
conduct in the future. 195 Third, a wrongdoer cannot be indemnified for punitive damages. l96 Therefore, the California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment in favor
of Transamerica. 197
VI. JUSTICE MosK's DISSENT: THE MAJORITY FAVORS
INSURERS

Justice Mosk was the sole dissenter from the majority's
holding that PPG could not recover the punitive damages
awarded against it as a result of Transamerica's tortious con-

190 5 ee,'d .
191 See id. (citing Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1996) and Soto v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y. 1994».
192
.
Id
193 See id.
194

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 658.

195 See id.
5 ee,'d .
197 See id .

196
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duct in failing to settle the Miller action. Instead, Justice
Mosk argued in favor of a neutral application of the law and
stood beside the California Civil Code's declaration that there
198
is a remedy for every wrong. Justice Mosk began his discussion by stating that in affirming the Court of Appeal's decision,
the majority not only favored Transamerica over PPG, but also
"favor[ed] all insurers over all their insureds."I99
A. GoOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING & THE INSURER'S DUTY TO
DEFEND

Justice Mosk first addressed an insurer's duty to defend its
insured pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair
2OO
Essentially, an insurance policy is a contract in
dealing.
which the insurer "makes promises" to an insured in consid201
The
eration for insurance premiums paid by the insured.
terms of such policies impose a duty upon the insurer "to defend its insured against damages for a covered claim by a victim of the insured.,,202 Should the insured become obligated to
pay damages for a claim covered by the policy, the insurer also
has the duty to reimburse, or indemnify, the insured up to the
amount of coverage specified in the insurance policy.203 Justice
Mosk agreed with the majority that, as a matter of law, covered claims against an insured include compensatory damages,
but generally do not include punitive damages, the purpose of
which is "to punish the insured itself " for its own
misconduct. 204 However, Justice Mosk recognized that implicit

198 See

PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 663 (Cal. 1999)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).

199

200

201
202

Id. at 658.
See id.
Id.
Id. (citing Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (1997».

203 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
.
.
204

Id. (relying on J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 59
Cal. App. 4th 6, 14 (1997) and CAL. INs. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). Justice Mosk
went on to say: "It has been stated: 'The insured's desire to secure the right to calion
the insurer's superior resources for the defense of ... claims is, in all likelihood, typically as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as is the wish to obtain
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in both the insurance policy and in the insurer's duty to defend
is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which
extends an insurer's duty to defend to include "a duty to make
reasonable efforts to settle a claim against its insured by the
205
insured's victim.
This obligation complies with California's
206
public policy favoring settlement.
Consequently, in satisfying its duty to settle a claim, the insurer is obligated to "give at
least as much weight to its insured's interests as to its own,
and must act as though it alone would have .to bear any ensu. . dgmen.
t»207
mgJu
Next, Justice Mosk asserted that, contrary to the majority's
argument, there is no prohibition against an insurer offering to
.settle for an amount that would avoid both compensatory and
punitive damages.208 If such a rule did exist, insurers would be
prevented from offering any amount at all for any claim alleging fraudulent or malicious misconduct that could potentially
result in punitive damages at trial. 209 However, Justice Mosk
argued that while such claims are simple to allege in a complaint, they may in fact be difficult to prove; thus, one cannot
"predict with any confidence what any given trier of fact may
find in the premises. »210

indemnity for possible liability. As a consequence, California courts have been consistently solicitous ofinsureds' expectations on this score.' This is true when the insured
is an individual man or woman. It is also true when the insured is a business entity.
Indeed, the functioning of a free and open market in contemporary society demands no
less." PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993».
205

[d. at 659. See, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1976); Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975);
and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
206 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Coleman v. Gulf Ins.
Group, 718 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk emphasized that
"the insurer's duty to settle arises from its interrelated duty to defend." PPG, 975
P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co.,
328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
207
208

209

210

PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
S ee id.
See id. at 660. Justice Mosk did not explain why or how this would happen.
d

],.
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Justice Mosk further characterized an insurer's wrongful
failure to settle a third party claim against its insured as a
breach of its duty.211 Upon this breach, the insurer has committed a tort against the insured, thereby making it liable for
any injuries proximately caused by its misconduct. 212 According to Justice Mosk, these injuries can include "any sums that
[an] insured became legally obligated to pay its victim as damages for its claim. ,,213 Because indemnification encompasses
mandatory payment pursuant to the terms of the actual insurance policy, the damages proximately resulting from the insurer's failure to settle "do not constitute indemnification.,,214
Thus, the amount of the insurer's liability for its breach is not
affected "by any limits on indemnification specified in any liTherefore, an insurer that
ability insurance policy.,,215
breaches its duty to settle a third party claim against its insured is liable to its insured for any resulting damages, namely
the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that "its
insured became legally obligated to pay" the third party.216
Any other result, Justice Mosk concluded, would leave the insured without a complete remedy for the injury suffered due to
the insurer's misconduct. 217

211
212
213

214

See id.
See PPG , 975 P.2d at 658 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

Id. at 660.

Id. Justice Mosk further asserted that "section 2772 of the Civil Code makes
plain [that indemnification] comprises payment that is required under the terms of a
liability insurance policy itself. Rather, as the very name declares, they are damages,
which comprise payment that is compelled by law. The 'principles' that operate here
are 'fundamental in our jurisprudence.''' Id. (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. 426
P.2d 173 (1967». "Section 3523 of the Civil Code sets out as a maxim of jurisprudence,
in the nature of public policy, that 'for every wrong there is a remedy.' Section 3274 of
the Civil Code implies that the 'remedy' for a tort is generally 'compensation.' For its
part, section 3281 of the Civil Code implies that compensation for a tort is 'in money,
which is called damages.' Lastly, section 3333 of the Civil Code states that the 'measure of damages' for a tort is generally the 'amount which will compensate for all the
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.m
Id.
215

216
217

Id.
Id. at 661.
See PPG , 975 P.2d at 661 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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B. ATTACKING THE MAJORITY'S PROXIMATE CAUSE ARGUMENT

Justice Mosk next addressed the majority's reliance on the
negligence-based notion of proximate cause in rendering its
decision against pPG. 21S He noted that while the majority relied on case law which suggests that proximate cause incorporates public policy considerations, it neglected to mention that
"such considerations are those that would make it 'unjust to
hold'the actor 'legally responsible.' ,,219 Justice Mosk concluded
that no considerations existed in this case that would mak.e it
unjust to hold Transamerica legally responsible since PPG
would have no obligation to pay damages in the Miller action
had Transamerica fulfilled its duty to settle the action in the
220
first pace.
I
C. THE MAJORITY'S PuBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS Do NOT "BEAR
ANY PERSUASIVE FORCE"

Justice Mosk continued his criticism of the majority's opinion by attacking its reliance on public policy arguments to sup221
port its affirmation of the lower court's opinion against pPG.
Before addressing each policy argument, however, Justice
Mosk began by asserting that none of the policy arguments
presented by the majority "proves to bear any persuasive
force. ,,222

21S

See id.

219 Id. Justice Mosk stated that "[the mlljority] quote[s] the observation of then
Justice Traynor, that proximate cause 'is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of
causation, but with the various considerations of [public] policy that limit an actor's
responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.''' Id. (quoting Mosley v. Arden
Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring». "But they fail to quote
Witkin's, that such considerations are those that would make it 'wijust to hold' that
actor 'legally responsible.''' Id. (quoting 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw,
TORTS § 968 (9th ed. 1988». "Considerations of this sort are altogether absent here."
Id.

220
221

222

See id.
See id.
PPG, 975 P.2d at 661.
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1. One's Liability Cannot Be Offset by Negligence of Another

Justice Mosk first addressed the majority's assertion that
the public policy prohibiting the offset of liability damages by
another's negligence would be violated if PPG was allowed to
shift to Transamerica its obligation to pay the punitive damages awarded against Solaglas. 223 Justice Mosk contended that
such a public policy would not even be implicated, let alone
violated. 224 The public policy at issue does not, as the majority
claimed, operate "by comparing the relative culpability of the
defendants in two separate actions.,,225 Rather, the public policy operates "by comparing the relative culpability of the plaintiff and the defendant within a single action. ,,226 Thus, the
California Civil Code's declaration that there is a remedy for
every wrong applies to Solaglas' wrong against Miller as well
as to Transamerica's wrong against Solaglas and pPG.227
2. Punish and Deter By Way of Example

Justice Mosk next addressed the majority's contention that
allowing PPG to transfer to Transamerica its obligation to pay
punitive damages in the Miller action would violate the public
policy that allows an award of punitive damages for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer and deterring similar conduct
in the future.228 However, Justice Mosk argued that subjecting
an insurer to such liability for breaching its duties to its insured is not inconsistent with either the deterrence or punish-

223

See id.

224See

id.

225 1d.. Justice Mosk continued, "[F]or example, the culpability of the insured in an
action brought against it by its victim for bodily injury and property damage vis-a-vis
the culpability of the insurer in an action brought against it by its insured for tortious
breach of its duty to settle." 1d.
226

1d. Justice Mosk continued, "[F]or example, the culpability of the insured's victim vis-a-vis the culpability of the insured itself in an action brought by the former
against the latter for bodily iIijury and property damage." 1d.

227
228

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 661 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
See id. at 661-62.
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ment aspects of the policy.229 First, Justice Mosk contended
that there is no conduct to deter since it is implausible that
PPG or Solaglas would be tempted to engage in wrongful conduct in the future hoping that Transamerica might breach its
duty to settle and therefore become liable to Solaglas or PPG
for damages. 23o Second, any liability imposed on the insurer
would be limited to "the insured's out-of-pocket costs attributable to the payment of punitive damages" and would not extend to "various related opportunity and transaction costs. ~1
Both opportunity and transaction costs tend to be substantial
since several years often pass between the time an insured
satisfies its obligation to pay punitive damages and the time
the insurer actually compensates the insured for the
payment. 232 Further, transaction costs encompass both the
"'monetary costs of the litigation' itself' and "'the toll the litigation takes' on the insured. ,"233

3. Indemnification of Punitive Damages Prohibited
Finally, Justice Mosk addressed the majority's contention
that imposing liability upon an insurer to indemnify the insured for punitive damages is prohibited by the public policy
forbidding indemnification of punitive damages.234 Justice
Mosk argued that like the first public policy, the policy against
indemnification of punitive damages would not be violated because it would not be implicated. 235 Even if the public policy
was in question, it would not be implicated any more than the
policy favoring settlement of the underlying third party claim
by the insurer. 236 In this situation, the payment made by the
insurer does not constitute indemnification since it comprises

229 See id. at 662.
230

S ee id .

231

[d.

232

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

233 [d.

(quoting Grimm v. Leinart, 705 F.2d 179, 183, n.4 (6th Cir. 1983».

234 See id.
235

236

See id.
See id.
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damages compelled by law as opposed to a required payment
237
pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy itself. In other
words, compelling such a payment by Transamerica to PPG
ensures that PPG will be compensated for the loss it incurred
238
as a result of Transamerica's breach.
Thus, just as there is
no policy prohibiting an insurer from making a settlement
payment to avoid punitive damages in the first place, there is
no policy prohibiting an insurer from making payment to the
insured to "make up for punitive damages" awarded against

.t 239

1 .

D. PuBLIC POLICY ACTUALLY FAVORS INSURER LIABILITY FOR
PuNITIVE DAMAGES

In contrast to the majority's reasoning that various public
policy considerations preclude the imposition of liability upon
an insurer for punitive damages awarded against its insured,
Justice Mosk argued that "public policies favoring settlement
and making a wrongdoer remedy its wrong" contradict the
240
. majority's conclusion.
Further, the failure to impose such
liability upon the insurer invites adverse consequences that
clearly violate public policy.241 It is well established that an
242
insurer has a duty to settle.
In satisfying this duty, the insurer must give, at a minimum, equal weight to its own and its
243
insured's interests.
The insurer must also "act as though it
alone would have to bear any ensuing judgment.,,244 However,
knowing that it will not be held liable for any punitive damages awarded against its insured may compel an insurer to
breach its duty to settle when a third party claim against its
insured pleads little compensatory damages, but high punitive

237

•

•

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
238 Id.
239

240

Id .
Id.

241
See id.
242

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

243

See id.

244 Id.
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245
damages.
Thus, the insurer would be unjustly enriched
while its insured is left to bear the costs of its insurer's
246
breach.
In essence, "the insurer would receive real premiums in consideration for an empty promise, and would also
avoid any payment in settlement."247 As a result, the insured
would bear both the threat of loss and the actual loss that a
248
settlement by the insurer would have prevented.
On the other hand, if an insurer can be held liable for punitive damages awarded against its insured, it would be encouraged to satisfy its duty to settle since the insurer would stand
to lose as much as the insured.249 The insurer would thus be
liable for breach of its duty to settle, adequately providing its
insured with a remedy.250 Justice Mosk argued that such a result would not diminish the impact or the purpose of punitive
damages to punish and deter. 251 Rather, as already pointed out
by Justice Mosk, both punishment and deterrence remain "in
the form of opportunity and transaction costs. "252

E. THE DISSENT'S CONCLUSION
In his dissent, Justice Mosk concluded that the majority
should have "simply allow[edl the law to operate in a neutral
fashion."253 An insurer must satisfy its duty to settle regardless of whether it is faced with compensatory or punitive damages.254 Further, just as there is a remedy for the wrong a
third party suffers as a result of the insured's misconduct,
there is a remedy for the wrong an insured suffers as a result
245
See id.
246

See id. at 663.

247

248

249
250
251
252

253

PPG, 975 P.2d at 663 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id ..
.

.

PPG, 975 P.2d at 663 (Mosk., J., dissenting).

Id

.

254 See ld.
.
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of the insurer's misconduct.256 For these reasons, Justice Mosk
dissented, stating simply that he could not, as did the majority,
"favor all insurers over their insureds on the issue of punitive
damages. ,,256
VII. CRITIQUE: THE MAJORITY IGNORED THE ISSUE
In ruling against PPG, the California Supreme Court ignored the merits of PPG's arguments. PPG never disputed
that California's public policy prohibits indemnification by an
insurer of punitive damages awarded against its insured in a
third party action.257 Rather, PPG contended that this public
policy was not applicable to the case at hand.258 PPG argued
that it was not seeking indemnification from Transamerica for
the punitive damages awarded against it in the Miller action.259
Instead, PPG sought recovery for the damages that Transamerica caused it to suffer in engaging in tortious conduct
during settlement negotiations. 260 At issue, then, was not California's public policy prohibiting indemnification of punitive
damages, but rather its public policy recognizing that a tortfeasor is responsible for damages resulting directly from its
misconduct. 261 In each of their respective decisions, however,
the trial court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court
ignored these important policies.
A. PPG SOUGHT RECOVERY FROM A TORTFEASOR, NOT

INDEMNIFICATION FROM AN INSURER
In affirming the Court of Appeal's decision, the California
Supreme Court relied heavily on its assertion that public policy
demands that wrongdoers pay for the consequences of their

266 See id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (Deering 1999».
266

[d.

See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 5.
258 See id.

257

259 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999).
260

261

See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4.
S ee id.
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actions. 262 In doing so, the court effectively relieved Transamerica of liability for its tortious conduct in failing to settle
the underlying claim. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court based their decisions on the idea that such a policy "cannot be undermined by passing the damages on to an
insurer, even one who has acted unreasonably.,,263 As PPG
pointed out in its brief, however, forty years of California case
law suggests the contrary.264
In California, "an insured should be made whole after an
insurance carrier breaches its duties towards its insured.,,265
Upon a breach, the insurer is liable for any resulting consequential damages whether or not the expenses are covered by
the policy, including such damages as lost profits, medical expenses, and attorneys' fees.266 In this case, Transamerica
breached its duty to settle by refusing to accept any of Miller's
settlement offers despite its knowledge that PPG risked suf267
fering a large adverse judgment.
As a consequence of its
breach, Transamerica should have been compelled to pay for
all damages that were the result thereof, including a punitive
damages award. As PPG noted in its brief, "[Transamerica]
should pay [for the punitive damages] not because they are
insured by the policy, but because they were caused by its own
separate tortious act. Such a result would promote, not infringe upon, California's public policy.,,266

262

See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656.

2tI3 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Cal. Ct.
App.1996).
264 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 14.
265

[d. (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 925 (1978».

See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433 (1967) (upholding damages
awarded to plaintiff for mental suffering resulting from insurer's tortious conduct).
266

267 See Petitioner's
..
.
Bnef, supra note 72, at 4.
266
[d. at 17.
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B. THE COURT DISREGARDED CALIFORNIA LAw FAVORING THE
SETTLEMENT OF LAWSUITS

In its brief to the Supreme Court, PPG clearly stated that
California case law favors settlements in litigation, especially
in situations where an insurer tenders the defense of its insured in a third party lawsuit. 269 When such a situation arises,
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing mandates
that an insurer settle a third party action against its insured
within policy limits when it is likely that a judgment will exceed the covered amount. 270 When the insurer does not attempt to reasonably settle and an excess judgment is rendered
against the insured, the excess is a consequence of the in271
surer's wrongful act. Thus, the insurer becomes liable in tort
to the insured for the excess judgment and must pay for all
damages resulting therefrom. 272 Whether or not the excess
judgment is covered by the insurance policy or is even insurable is irrelevant. The only issue is whether the excess judgment "was a consequence of the insurance carrier's breach of its
duty to settle.,,273 In this case, it was.
C. POLICY DOES NOT PRECLUDE SETTLING LAWSUITS THAT
. INCLUDE PuNITIVE DAMAGES
Another important point PPG advanced in its brief to the
court is that "California public policy does not prohibit a party
from settling a lawsuit that includes punitive damages. ,,274 A
settlement within policy limits avoids the possibility of an excess judgment at all, whether or not punitive damages are included in the judgment. To contend otherwise suggests that

269

270
271

.

See id. at 6.
See supra notes 6 - 70 and accompanying text.
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 7.

272 See id. (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429 (1967) and Brandt
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813 (1985».

273 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 7.
274 [d.. at 8.
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those who settle avoid being punished for their misconduct. As
6
the dissent recognized in Lira v. Shelter Insurance Co.r
No party suggests that public policy precludes
the settlement of a punitive damages claim
that results in insulation of an insured from
liability for such damages. This being the
case, when such a settlement is not achieved
as a consequence of bad faith breach of an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing,
there is no reason that the insurer should not
bear the consequences of a resulting punitive
damages award against its insured. Indeed,
such a result promotes the public policy of encouraging good faith and fair dealing by insurers, who control the defense of actions brought
against their insureds.276
Here, by breaching its duty to settle, Transamerica became
the wrongdoer. PPG would not have suffered the excess judgment but for Transamerica's failure to honor its duty. By not
compelling Transamerica to compensate PPG for the punitive
damages judgment, the court allowed Transamerica to escape
liability for its bad faith.277 In the same breath that it condemned PPG for its alleged attempt to avoid the consequences
of its wrongful act, the court permitted Transamerica to do so.
In so doing, the court gave insurers "no incentive to fulfill their
obligations to their insureds," but instead gave them the option
to force insureds to take risky third party cases to trial.276 California's public policy is certainly not furthered by such an outcome.

275

913 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1996).

276 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 9 (quoting Lira v. Shelter Insurance Co., 913
P.2d 514, 521 (Colo. 1996».
277

278

See id. at 13.

d

[,.
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D. FORCING AN INSURER TO PAY THE CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES OF ITS WRONGFUL CONDUCT DOES NOT PuT IT IN A
NO-WIN SITUATION
Concededly, distinguishing between indemnification for punitive damages and recovery for consequential damages, as
suggested by Justice Mosk in his dissent, seems to put the insurer in a no-win situation. On one hand, it seems there is no
harm to the insured if the insurer fails to settle, but no punitive damages are ultimately awarded. In this situation, the
entire judgment, presuming it is within policy limits, will be
covered by the policy. On the other hand, if punitive damages,
which are not usually covered by insurance policies, are ultimately awarded, the insured can recover on the theory that the
insurer failed to settle. In both circumstances, the insurer becomes liable for the entire third party judgment. Thus, upon
initial review, it seems that the insurer would forever be responsible for punitive damages awarded against its insured,
except where there is a settlement demand greater than policy
limits.
However, the above scenario incorrectly suggests that, under Justice Mosk's analysis, an insurer that seeks to avoid the
threat of punitive damages against its insured must essentially settle for any amount within policy limits. Yet, if an insurer accepts or attempts to accept a reasonable settlement
offer of a covered claim in circumstances where a judgment in
excess of policy limits is likely, it will have fulfilled its duty to
the insured and would not be liable for damages. 279 As PPG
argued in its brief to the court, when an excess judgment is
imminent, the possibility of punitive damages does not need to
280
be considered in settlement negotiations.
PPG argued that
"if Transamerica simply had fulfilled its duties without even
considering the punitive damage threat against PPG, PPG
would not have faced a punitive damages judgment."281 Thus,

279

280
281

See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 9.
[d.
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the insurer must simply give at least equal weight to its insured's interests, as the law requires it to do.282
Furthermore, if an insured is likely to face an excess judgment, whether punitive damages or not, an insurer should
make all reasonable attempts to settle the claim within policy
limits.283 The insurer is not authorized to gamble with its insured's money, as Transamerica seems to have done here. An
insurer should not be able to pursue litigation merely because
the possible excess judgment includes punitive damages. 2M As
Justice Mosk noted, the insurer must "act as though it alone
would have to bear any ensuing judgment."285 Clearly, Transamerica failed to fulfill this duty when it repeatedly refused to
settle the Miller lawsuit.288 In fact, Transamerica failed to settle even after a jury found in favor of Miller in the first lawsuit. 287 In so doing, Transamerica breached its duty to settle
and became liable for any consequential damages arising
therefrom. The type of damages ultimately incurred is of no
consequence. Here, PPG suffered a one million dollar punitive
damages judgment as a result of Transamerica's tortious conduct. As such, PPG was entitled to recover. Had Transamerica demonstrated reasonable attempts to settle the Miller
action within policy limits, it would have fulfilled its duty to
PPG. Thus, whether or not settlement negotiations proved
.successful, any excess judgment incurred by PPG would not
have been caused by Transameiica. Therefore, any resulting
judgment would not be classified as consequential damages
and, thus, would not be recoverable by PPG.

282 See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 20l.
283
284

See WINDT, supra note 1, §5.12, at 324.
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

285 [d.
286

See supra notes 169 - 190 and accompanying text.

287 See id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's holding in PPG Industries,
Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance Co. imposes a tremendous
hardship on insureds who have been wronged by their insurers. While the court correctly states California's policy against
indemnification of punitive damages, a fact that PPG conceded
to in its brief to the court, it incorrectly applied that policy in
this case. As Justice Mosk acknowledged in his dissenting
opinion, imposition of damages pursuant to law is not the
equivalent of indemnification under an insurance policy.288
PPG was entitled to recover for the damages it suffered as a
result of Transamerica's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, regardless of whether the recoverable
damages were equal in amount to the punitive damages
awarded in the Miller lawsuit. There is a difference between
holding an insurer responsible for an insured's liability for punitive damages and holding an insurer responsible for its own
wrong. While an insurer indeed should not be forced to bear
the burden of its insured's wrong, neither should it be allowed
to escape liability for its own wrong merely because the defining law is murky. By holding otherwise, the California Supreme Court has not only excused insurers from liability for
their tortious conduct in defending their insureds whenever
punitive damages are involved, but has also endorsed it.

Jennifer A Emmaneet

288 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamenca
. Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 662 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
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